How to Combine Influence Tactics: Using the Elaboration Likelihood Model to Guide Sequencing of Tactics

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ABSTRACT

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Tony Bongiorno

This scenario study used a 3 (influence tactic) x 2 (strength of rational persuasion) experimental design to investigate what combination of proactive influence tactics was most effective in gaining commitment. It was only the second study after Barry and Shapiro (1992) to examine experimentally combinations of proactive influence tactics. It used the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) to derive hypotheses. It tested 103 individuals (46 men and 57 women) who were on average 20.8 years old. Participants read a hypothetical e-mail by a co-manager. They rated the extent to which they would commit to the co-manager's request. They also listed their positive and negative thoughts about the issue. The results showed that: 1) Rational persuasion gained the same amount of commitment whether it was combined with ingratiation or apprising; 2) ingratiation and apprising did not affect how deeply participants scrutinized the issue (i.e., elaboration); 3) commitment was not related to participants' level of elaboration; and 4) the number of influence tactics used did not change the level of commitment. One hypothesis was supported: that stronger rational persuasion gains more commitment than weaker forms of rational persuasion. These results are consistent with some of the literature, which states that not all tactics can be effectively combined. These conclusions are explored in light of the study's limitations. Future lines of research using ELM are also discussed.

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Introduction

Influence through words is a powerful concept that can help avoid the need for coercion and violence. It is noteworthy that with enough skill we can be perceived as charming, honest, and competent while influencing others to willingly change their extreme views/opinions with a few choice words. The ability to influence others is very useful in one's personal life as well as in politics. It also has important implications in the workplace.

The organizational behavior literature on conflict management (e.g., Munduate, Ganaza, Peiro, & Euwema, 1999), issue selling (e.g., Dutton & Ashford, 1993) and champions of innovation (e.g., Howell & Boies, 2004) highlights the everyday need and desire to change co-workers' ideas. This includes subordinates, peers and superiors. The wish to influence others is not always driven by personal gain (e.g., to get increased pay or receive higher profile assignments). As a peer, one also desires that other employees willingly implement policies and requests with as little resistance as possible. Sometimes co-workers will disagree about key issues on projects or day-to-day activities. Project delays, unfair division of tasks, or the need for assistance are some common themes that arise. Disagreements on such points can slow down progress at work and reduce efficiency (Yukl, Guinan, & Sottolano, 1995). From time to time, employees also try to change a co-worker's approach to a task for one he/she feels is better (Yukl et al., 1995). Differences in opinion can arise on any of these issues. Because peers will not always agree on what solutions are best, an employee would do well to learn an effective set of influence skills to minimize the chance of conflict with other co-workers while trying to achieve the objectives described above. In one sense, time saved on convincing others to

support a plan, divide work or give assistance, is time gained for implementing and perfecting a project/assignment. Therefore, the ability to influence peers is one key to efficiency.

Research Question

Once the need for effective influence skills is established, the question arises about what are the most effective influence strategies? Do the same tactics work in all situations, and how many tactics should one use? Neither of these questions has concrete answers. The organizational literature on the type of influence tactics that will be studied here are still in the nascent, exploratory stage (Yukl, Chavez, & Seifert, 2005). Within the literature, an influence tactic refers to a strategy in which a person (i.e., the agent) tries to persuade another individual (i.e., the target) to change their behavior. One example is when an agent refers to values and ideals to stir the target's emotions. This influence strategy is called 'inspirational appeal'. Another technique is to be friendly and kind to the target so that he/she is more receptive to influence. This is called 'ingratiation'.

However, because the literature on influence tactics is still growing, it cannot provide individuals with detailed recommendations about what strategies to use. In order to one day train employees to successfully influence peers while avoiding conflict, this thesis focuses on the issue of multiple influence tactics. For example, for employees and researchers in the field, it is not clear whether ingratiation is best used with inspirational appeals or rational persuasion (i.e., using logic and facts to persuade a target). Such concerns have been given little attention in the literature and serious work on these issues is missing. As a result, this thesis tries to answer the following research question: What combinations of influence tactics are most likely to gain employee commitment?

Why tactic combinations are important. This investigation of tactic combinations is important for several reasons. One reason is that there is a current debate about how different tactics affect each other (e.g., Emans, Munduate, Klaver, & Van de Vliert, 2003). For example, some tactics are believed to decrease the likelihood of persuasion when present in some combinations, but increase persuasion when present in other combinations (Barry & Shapiro, 1992). Secondly, influence tactics are rarely used in isolation. Individuals often use sets of tactics rather than a single tactic (Yukl, 2006). Therefore, focusing on one tactic at a time is short-sighted because it does not reflect how they are used in the real-world. This makes the concern about how to combine tactics more important; individuals might unwittingly undermine their own influence efforts by using tactics that the literature finds should not be combined.

In addition, the above research question was also chosen to solve three problems in the influence tactic literature. Firstly, only one study (Barry & Shapiro, 1992) has experimentally explored influence tactic combinations, and little is known about how different influence tactics will enhance or undermine one another. Secondly, previous studies have relied on influence incidents (Schilit & Locke, 1982) and field surveys (Barry & Bateman, 1992), from which causality cannot be inferred (Emans et al., 2003; Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Such studies have not been able to separate the role of intervening variables (e.g., the agent's expertise in using each tactic) in gaining compliance or commitment (Yukl et al., 2005; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). This thesis is only the second study to experimentally investigate influence tactics combinations. A third problem has been that the proactive tactic literature is missing a comprehensive theory to determine how different tactics should be combined. In answer to this problem, this thesis uses the

elaboration likelihood model (ELM) from social psychology to generate hypotheses about influence tactic combinations.

Thesis overview. This thesis first presents a basic model of commitment to guide the reader. It will then go on to (1) define the main variables involved in the study; (2) describe how the hypothetical scenarios will manipulate the different influence tactics; (3) develop the hypotheses regarding the study; (4) describe the materials and experimental methodology used to test the hypotheses; (5) present and analyze the results of the study; and (6) discuss the implications of the results in the context of the extant literature on proactive tactics.

Model Overview

Within the influence tactic literature, there exist many ways in which commitment can be evoked or enhanced. The question that has plagued the area is what tactics are most effective for gaining high commitment. Commitment has several positive outcomes. For example, increased motivation (a construct conceptually similar to commitment) has been linked with desirable outcomes such as greater job satisfaction, better employee performance and less turnover. Positive effects like these make increasing commitment a central focus of the influence tactic literature. However, the facilitating conditions for achieving different degrees of commitment are poorly understood. What is the process by which an individual decides to put more or less effort (i.e., more or less commitment) into performing a request? Under what conditions would a peer simply comply versus fully commit?

The model of commitment. Figure 1 shows a box and arrow diagram with the major variables included in this thesis and involved in gaining commitment: Agent's

influence tactics, target's elaboration, target's commitment and the agent's strength of rational persuasion. The diagram is based on the elaboration likelihood model by Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, b). ELM, as originally conceived by Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, b) did not include influence tactics. Therefore, the insertion of this variable represents an extrapolation, which was done for the purpose of this study and to root the model in the influence tactic literature (Yukl, 2006; Yukl, Lepsinger, & Lucia, 1992).

According to Figure 1, the target's elaboration (i.e., how willing a person is to think deeply about a message) mediates the relationship between the agent's influence tactics and the target's commitment. An agent's use of different influence tactics will make a target more or less receptive to a request (elaboration), which in turn makes the target more or less likely to commit. However, the relation between elaboration and commitment is moderated by the strength of the agent's arguments (i.e., strength of rational persuasion). In the end, commitment is the result of an influence tactic and the strength of the argument. This is the basic model of commitment used for this study. For readers to better understand Figure 1, the four variables shown in the model are now defined.

Variables Defined

Target's commitment. In order to understand how proactive influence tactics might affect commitment, one must first understand what commitment is. Yukl (2006) defined a continuum of responses to influence attempts, anchored by two types of successful outcomes: commitment and compliance. Success simply means that the target performed the request. However, the target's motivation while he or she performs the request can vary. If the target accepts the task with low motivation (i.e., performs it



Figure 1. The Model of Commitment: The Effect of Influence Tactic, Elaboration and Strength of Rational Persuasion on Commitment.

unenthusiastically and exerts minimal effort), this is called compliance. He or she performs the task but is not convinced by its need or importance. However, if the target accepts the task with high motivation, this is called commitment. It refers to an internal change for the target. The person will perform a request wholeheartedly and believe it is an important thing to do. In both commitment and compliance the target accepts the agent's request (i.e., a successful outcome), but they do so with different levels of motivation. Commitment is an internal, long-lasting successful outcome while compliance is only a short-term successful outcome with a temporary change in the target's attitude and/or behavior.

Although both outcomes represent a form of success, commitment is more desirable because it is longer lasting and internal. An employee who is committed to a task should require less effort by peers to remind or repeat the request in the future. At the same time, it should be easier to gain commitment from that employee on similar requests than if that employee had simply complied in the first place. That is, gaining commitment entails future benefits that compliance does not.

Having defined commitment in this way, one can argue that the goal of influence tactics is to gain commitment rather than compliance. This is not to say that commitment can be gained in all situations. There will certainly be times when commitment is not possible (e.g., there is not enough time to convince a peer to be committed) or very unlikely (e.g., some tasks/requests are extremely undesirable).

Target's elaboration. Elaboration is another key concept that can help one understand the relationship between influence tactics and commitment. The construct is central to ELM and refers to "the extent to which a person carefully thinks about issue-

relevant information" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, p.7). A situation where a person does not try to think about an issue is called low elaboration. When a person carefully scrutinizes arguments inside the message, it is called high elaboration. Low and high elaboration represent two extremes on a continuum. Thus elaboration refers to how much the target will scrutinize the issue-relevant arguments that the agent puts out during an influence attempt[1]. It also explains how different influence tactics lead to commitment.

Agent's influence tactics. An influence tactic is a behavior used to change a target's behavior/ attitude. The direction of influence can be lateral (peer-to-peer), upward (subordinate-to-superior), or downward (superior-to-subordinate). Research has shown that some tactics tend to be used in one direction more than others. However, this is usually because one's status (e.g., being a subordinate rather than a peer or a superior) limits the tools and power available to an agent. For the purpose of this study, the experimental design focused on lateral influence in order to eliminate power differences between the target and agent. This was done to simplify the influence attempt and to keep the focus on ELM's predictions. Furthermore, this study focused on proactive influence in contrast to impression management or political tactics. While there is overlap, each of these three categories is associated with different goals on the part of the agent (Yukl, 2006).

Impression management tactics are used to change how a target perceives the agent. One example is to purposely talk about one's accomplishments to make a target

[1] Petty and Caccioppo (1986a) use the expression "persuasive communication" to refer to any type of attempt at persuading others. This includes face-to-face attempts such as a discussion between two people as well as things like advertisements or letters that do not require both parties to be present. This thesis will use the expression "influence attempt" to ground the theory in influence tactic research and refer to face-to-face episodes of influence alone.

view the agent more positively. Impression management can also be used to make oneself feared or more respected by others (Yukl, 2006). Political tactics are used to gain benefits from a target. For example, an agent can choose a committee member that will favor them when making important decisions. In comparison, proactive tactics are used when an agent expects a target to resist their request[2]. While the nature of the request is wide-ranging, proactive tactics concern what Yukl referred to as immediate task objectives. This includes persuading the target (i.e., the employee) to perform a new task, to support a change, or simply to cooperate with the peer (Yukl et al., 2005).

Influence tactics used in this study. Eleven proactive tactics have been identified by Yukl and his colleagues (Yukl, 2006; see Table 1 for a full taxonomy and definitions). These tactics are used in all three directions of influence. This taxonomy is an alternative to Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson's (1980) original taxonomy, which consisted of six tactics and only covered upward influence. Of the eleven tactics identified, three will be studied here: rational persuasion, apprising, and ingratiation. Rational persuasion is the use of logic to persuade an agent. Apprising is the attempt to show the target the benefits they will incur from complying/committing to the request. Ingratiation is the use of friendliness and other strategies to make the agent more likeable. For the purpose of this study the goal was to identify facilitating conditions that make rational persuasion more or less effective in gaining commitment. The other two tactics (apprising and ingratiation) were used as a means to induce those favorable or unfavorable conditions; they were manipulated through scenarios.

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[2] One must note that this definition does not explicitly say whether proactive tactics are used before or after the request. The literature is silent on the issue. Therefore both options are available to the agent.

Table 1

A Taxonomy of Eleven Proactive Influence Tactics

Influence Tactic	Definition
Rational persuasion	The agent uses arguments based on logic and facts. The goal is to show that the request is possible and that it applies to company objectives.
Apprising	The agent uses facts and logic to show how a request will help the target's career or give other personal benefits.
Inspirational appeals	The agent tries to stir up the target's emotions. He/ she will also refer to values and ideals to gain commitment.
Consultation	The agent makes a point of asking for a target's advice about a request/ change/ proposal (e.g. to recommend improvements).
Collaboration	The agent makes the target an offer: If the target goes along with a request/proposal the agent will give him/her everything necessary (e.g. resources) to get it done.

Influence Tactic	Definition
Ingratiation	The agent highlights a target's good qualities with praise and flattery. He/she can also make a point to express trust in the target's ability to get a difficult task/request done.
Personal appeals	The agent asks a target to perform a request as a friend rather than an employee. He/she might also start by asking for a personal favor and then make the request.
Exchange	This is based on the idea "you scratch my back, I scratch yours". The agent promises to return the favor now or later. He/she can also offer other incentives.
Coalition tactics	The agent points out that others have also supported the request. He/she can get others' help to convince the target to support a request/proposal.
Legitimating	The agents tries to prove that 1) his/her authority to make a request is legitimate or 2) the request itself is legitimate. Reference to policies or rules is an example.
Pressure	The agent can phrase the request as a demand. He/she can also make threats or constantly remind/check up on the target.

Note. This table is based on Yukl's (2006) taxonomy of proactive tactics.

Reasons for using these tactics. Rational persuasion was chosen because it is the most widely used tactic in the taxonomy. It is employed consistently and equally in all three directions of influence. This may be because it is one of the most effective tactics (Yukl, 2006) as well as quite socially acceptable to use (Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993). Therefore, it was reasonable for this exploratory study to use rational persuasion as the central tactic in the combination sequence. The other two tactics (apprising and ingratiation) were chosen because they have similar characteristics. Although they are not as commonly used as rational persuasion, they are equally and moderately effective in gaining compliance/commitment. They also tend to be used with other tactics rather than alone (Yukl et al., 1993). Thus, the individual effectiveness of each tactic was not expected to confound the results.

Agent's strength of rational persuasion. The last variable in the model is strength of rational persuasion. It was operationalized based on Yukl's (2006) definition:

> Rational persuasion involves the use of explanations, logical arguments, and factual evidence to show that a request or proposal is feasible and relevant for attaining task objectives. A weak form of rational persuasion may include only a brief description of the reason for a request, or an undocumented assertion that a proposed change is desirable and feasible. Stronger forms of rational persuasion include a detailed explanation of the reasons why a request or proposed change is important, and presentation of concrete evidence that the proposal is feasible (p. 165).

This definition was the basis for manipulating the strength of rational persuasion in the scenarios. As a result, the above-mentioned variables (influence tactics,

elaboration, commitment and strength of rational persuasion) were the central focus of this study.

Study Overview

This study used a 2 (strength of rational persuasion) x 3 (preceding tactic) experimental design to show how two different preceding tactics (apprising and ingratiation) can change the effectiveness of rational persuasion. This structure was one of many possible sequences of combinations that could have been used. The dependent variable was the degree of commitment to the request and the mediator was the extent of elaboration by a target. The two independent variables were the strength of the rational persuasion used and the types of tactics that preceded it. There were two forms of rational persuasion: strong logical arguments versus weak logical arguments. Each form of rational persuasion (strong and weak) was preceded by one of three influence tactics conditions: ingratiation, apprising or no influence tactic (the control condition). Table 2 shows the structure of the hypothetical scenarios for each experimental condition.

Hypotheses

The first hypothesis concerns the extent to which the number of tactics used would affect the degree of commitment. Each of the combinations in this study could be reduced to one of two categories: Use of one tactic (control condition) versus use of two tactics (apprising or ingratiation conditions). No research has examined experimentally the effectiveness of the number of proactive influence tactics. Although only two tactics were combined in each condition, this study still provides an initial attempt to test the generalizability of the conclusions drawn from correlational research. Case, Dosier, Murkinson, and Keys (1988) and Falbe and Yukl (1992) both concluded that several

Table 2.

Structure of Hypothetical Scenarios in Each Experimental Condition

Condition	1	2	3	4	5	6
First Tactic Participant is Exposed to	Apprising	Ingratiation	Control	Apprising	Ingratiation	Control
Second Tactic Participant is Exposed to	Strong Rational Persuasion	Strong Rational Persuasion	Strong Rational Persuasion	Weak Rational Persuasion	Weak Rational Persuasion	Weak Rational Persuasion

tactics are more effective than a single tactic. Related research indirectly supports this. For example, Howell and Higgins (1990) showed that more effective champions of innovation used a greater variety of influence tactics to successfully advance their ideas. Similarly, Emans et al. (2003) showed that, in police departments, a mix of hard tactics (e.g., pressure and repetition) and soft tactics (e.g., ingratiation and consultation) could be just as, or more, effective than using soft tactics alone. Therefore, these studies support variety as a way to increase effectiveness. In conjunction with Falbe and Yukl (1992) and Case et al. (1988), it seems reasonable to suggest that using more tactics will have a greater effect. Therefore, regardless of the strength of rational persuasion and the type of tactic to precede it (apprising versus ingratiation), it was expected that the conditions with two tactics should be more successful than the conditions that used only one tactic. This would support the above-mentioned studies, which could not definitively establish causality.

Hypothesis 1: Participants presented with 2 tactics will commit more to the request than participants presented with only one tactic.

The second hypothesis concerned the differential effects of each influence tactic (apprising or ingratiation) on the mediator variable: target's elaboration. This construct referred to the extent to which a target thought about an agent's message. One who deeply processes the message (e.g., its correctness, implications and validity) exemplifies high elaboration whereas one who does not think about the argument's merits exemplifies low elaboration. The construct is central to the ELM and determines how a target will react to

one's specific arguments. Elaboration explains why an influence tactic ultimately leads to commitment.

The elaboration likelihood model focuses on how to get someone to pay attention to what you have to say. It explains what factors affect how invested a target is in the agent's message. Some situations make a target more wiling to listen carefully to the agent (e.g., the message is personally relevant to the agent) while others make a target less interested (e.g., the target is in a hurry to leave). In each situation, ELM prescribes different ways to persuade the target. One can manipulate the situation to make a target more or less interested in thinking carefully about the message. This thesis argues that influence tactics can be used to manipulate these situations according to ELM's recommendations.

To understand this, one must know the mechanisms underlying the three influence tactic conditions used in this thesis: apprising, ingratiation and control. Apprising refers to the use of logic to show how a target will personally benefit from committing to the agent's request. Ingratiation refers to the use of flattery and friendliness to increase the target's likelihood of commitment. The control condition presented neutral information that did not use any influence tactic whatsoever. Instead, it presented information that was irrelevant to the issue at hand. It also remained neutral by not discussing issues such as the agent's credibility or other personal characteristics.

The probability that a target will carefully scrutinize a persuasion message is called the elaboration likelihood. Conditions are favorable when they allow the target to elaborate on the message. Some examples of favorable conditions include having sufficient time to think about the agent's message or having enough knowledge to think

about the issue in detail. In unfavorable conditions, the target might have very little time to think about the message or have little knowledge about the topic. Under favorable conditions, elaboration likelihood is high, but in unfavorable elaboration conditions, the situation conspires against the target to make elaboration likelihood low. According to ELM, proactive influence tactics should be able to change a target's degree of elaboration about an issue by triggering an agent's willingness to process.

Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, b) name personal involvement/ relevance as the most important variable to do so. An issue is personally relevant when the persuadee believes it will "have significant consequences for their own lives" (Apsler & Sears, 1968; taken from Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, p. 81). For example, the issue of raising tuition rates for Universities in England will have less personal relevance to Canadians than if the same situation occurred in Canada. This is but one way of establishing personal relevance. Petty and Cacioppo (1986b) recognize that an issue can be personally relevant in different ways. The number, type, magnitude and duration of the consequences of an issue should each affect the degree of relevance. Even so, when an individual has a vested interest in an issue, or is directly affected by it, it is much more important to evaluate the relevant arguments. In this way, creating personal relevance for a target should increase the extent to which one will want to scrutinize issue-relevant arguments (i.e., elaboration likelihood will be higher) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). It is important to note that while personal relevance increases the willingness to think about an issue, persuasion also depends on the strength of the arguments presented. Thus, personal relevance does not directly lead to persuasion. It is a variable that we wish to manipulate so as to increase elaboration likelihood.

The goal of apprising closely relates to the establishment of personal relevance. Yukl (2006) defined apprising as a tactic used to show a target how compliance/ commitment with a request will benefit them personally. Benefits include career moves, salary increases or more autonomy at work. The goal is to make clear that these benefits are direct consequences of compliance/commitment with the agent's request. In this way apprising also seeks to establish what Petty and Cacioppo (1986b) call personal responsibility. This is the degree to which an individual is personally accountable for the consequences of their compliance/ commitment versus resistance to the request. Therefore, apprising seeks to establish both personal relevance and personal responsibility in a target. In ELM, both factors increase a target's likelihood to scrutinize issue-relevant arguments. While apprising will be used to establish personal relevance/responsibility, other tactics such as inspirational appeal can also be used. However, for the purpose of this exploratory study, the goal of apprising most closely fits the goals described in ELM.

Another situational factor in elaboration likelihood is the use of mood. While personal relevance and responsibility affect the extent of elaboration, mood affects the direction of one's thoughts (Petty, Heesacker, & Hughes, 1997). That is, the thoughts that an agent elicits from a target can be either biased against the message (e.g., developing counter arguments), in favor of the message (e.g., supporting arguments), or balanced and objective. When we consider influence tactics, good mood is a peripheral cue that can be elicited by ingratiation. A peripheral cue refers to any source of information that is irrelevant to the issue being discussed but is used to make the target's

decision about that issue. These are characteristics outside the discussion such as an agent's attractiveness, likeability or level of expertise on the topic.

Some forms of inspirational appeal might also induce good mood, but ingratiation does so directly. It is used to make oneself better liked by a target by being nice, friendly and polite. Because ingratiation creates peripheral cues (i.e., issue-irrelevant information) such as mood and likeability, it will not affect the target's willingness to scrutinize issue-relevant arguments. Therefore, in the current study, the presence of ingratiation should not increase elaboration more than when ingratiation is not used (i.e., the control condition). However, given the earlier discussion on responsibility and personal relevance, apprising should lead to greater elaboration than both the ingratiation condition and control condition. Therefore, each influence tactic was expected to have a differential effect on elaboration because they trigger different situational factors. Apprising elicits personal relevance and responsibility while ingratiation evokes mood. The control condition was designed so as to not trigger either factor.

Hypothesis 2: Participants first exposed to apprising will show greater argument scrutiny (elaboration) than will participants first exposed to ingratiation or the control (neutral) condition.

Hypothesis 2 links influence tactics to elaboration, which has not been done in previous literature. Hypothesis 3 examines the main effect of the agent's strength of rational persuasion on the target's commitment. ELM posits that a target pays attention to

peripheral cues such as agent credibility, status, attractiveness and expertise. The strong rational persuasion condition provides such peripheral information about the agent's expertise, knowledge, and status. The weak condition's arguments were designed to not give peripheral information that would suggest expertise or status. Therefore, it was expected that under low elaboration the strong argument would gain more commitment than the weak argument because it provided positive peripheral information in addition to central cues, whereas the weak condition did not provide either.

Hypothesis 3: Participants exposed to strong rational persuasion will show more commitment than participants exposed to weak rational persuasion.

While the above hypothesis concerns the main effect of the strength of rational persuasion, Hypothesis 4 examines how elaboration leads to commitment. According to ELM, the relationship between elaboration and commitment is strongly moderated by argument strength. Therefore, elaboration cannot be discussed without considering argument strength.

To understand how argument strength moderates this relationship, one has to be aware of the two routes to persuasion: the central route and the peripheral route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, b). Under favorable conditions (i.e., high elaboration likelihood), the target will process a message through the central route. This route to information processing is associated with the highest level of elaboration. The individual generates his/her own thoughts about the agent's message and evaluates whether the information is strong or weak. The stronger the argument, the more likely a target will be persuaded.

However, a strong argument is most persuasive for a target that uses central route processing (i.e., is willing to examine the arguments in some detail). The other way to process information is through the peripheral route, which occurs under unfavorable elaboration conditions. When a target makes a decision using only the peripheral route (i.e., uses peripheral cues), argument strength is not as important to the target. Instead, one is mostly persuaded by factors not directly related to the issue itself (e.g., whether or not the agent is an expert).

Peripheral route processing is used when elaboration likelihood is low. Under unfavorable conditions a target will either not want to, or cannot, extensively elaborate on a message. It could be because of limited time to analyze a message or because a target is already uninterested. Through this route, the target is less likely to be persuaded by argument strength because they are not willing to take the time to carefully scrutinize the information.

Rather than rely on argument strength to be persuaded, peripheral route processing uses heuristics to reach a decision. Some examples of heuristics are that longer arguments are necessarily better or that more facts indicate more expertise. In addition, peripheral route decisions are more likely to be based on issue-irrelevant cues such as whether the agent is an authority figure or if they are physically attractive. In each example, the peripheral cue is not directly related to the information contained inside the agent's message yet still influences a target. Peripheral information acts as an alternative to central information (i.e., argument strength). Each route to persuasion denotes the type of information that will most likely influence/persuade a target under high or low elaboration likelihood.

Putting this all together, if an agent uses weak arguments, a target who finds the issue important and relevant (i.e., high elaboration) is more likely to break down those arguments and refute the message. However, a target who does not the feel the issue is relevant (i.e., low elaboration) will be less likely to think critically and less likely to refute those weak arguments through careful analysis. Commitment will decrease as elaboration increases. However, for strong arguments, targets in low elaboration conditions will not pay much attention to the arguments themselves. They will not be convinced by the strength of the arguments. Instead, peripheral information will sway their decision. However, the same strong arguments will be persuasive for a high elaboration target because that is the type of information that is important to him/her. As a result, commitment will increase as elaboration increases.

Hypothesis 4: Argument strength will moderate the relationship between elaboration and commitment such that elaboration will be negatively related to commitment for weak arguments but will be positively related to commitment when the argument is strong.

To summarize, the model presented in Figure 1 shows that elaboration mediates the relationship between influence tactics and commitment. Influence tactics are expected to evoke different levels of target elaboration. Strength of rational persuasion is expected to moderate the relationship between elaboration and commitment. It is also expected to directly affect overall commitment. The next section describes the design and materials

used to test the hypotheses. This is then followed by an analysis of the data and a discussion of the results' implications for future research and practice.

Method

Participants

The sample was composed of 103 participants (between 15 and 18 participants per experimental condition). This sample size mirrored past scenario studies that used between 10 and 15 participants per condition (e.g., Barry & Shapiro, 1992; Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Participants were recruited from the John Molson School of Business participant pool and recruitment posters. The pool consisted of students registered in an introductory organizational behaviour course. Participants recruited from this pool received 1% toward their final grade. Participants outside the pool were not given a reward. Participants' ages ranged between 18 and 34 years old ($M = 20.8$, $SD = 3.8$). There were 45 men and 56 women; two participants did not report their gender.

Experimental Design

The design was a 2 (strength of rational persuasion) x 3 (preceding tactic) completely randomized factorial design. There were six experimental conditions. In each condition, two variables were measured: the extent of elaboration and the extent of compliance/commitment by participants.

The two experimental conditions (influence tactics and argument strength) were manipulated through scenarios. These hypothetical scenarios described an influence attempt by a co-manager who tried to convince the participant to adopt a new training program. This context was chosen to minimize the amount of prior knowledge participants might bring to the experiment because using an issue personally relevant to them could have increased the likelihood of elaboration and undermined the expected

effects. The current scenario tried to use an emotionally neutral issue in order to reduce prior biases.

The scenario began with an introduction to the general context of the influence attempt. This introduction was held constant across each experimental condition. It was developed using Fu and Yukl's (2000) scenario types. For the present study, participants were told that a co-manager of equal authority and power was trying to convince the participant to adopt a new training program called Structured Training. Some drawbacks of the program were described to prevent the issue from being one-sided. Otherwise, most participants would have probably agreed with the co-manager. This would have undermined the influence tactics. The co-manager's gender was not specified.

An email from the co-manager was shown next. It contained the influence tactics used to influence the participant's decision. The email had two parts. It started with one influence tactic, followed by rational persuasion. These parts represented the two experimental manipulations: type of influence tactic preceding rational persuasion and argument strength. All scenarios were of equal length.

Type of influence tactic before rational persuasion. This variable was manipulated in the first paragraph of the email. The size of the paragraph was held relatively constant (i.e., between 5 and 7 lines). The paragraph showed one of three possible influence tactic conditions: ingratiation, apprising, or control.

In the apprising condition (Appendices A and B), the target's personal benefit was made clear. An example was the co-manager' statement 'This is really something that would advance your career by about 3 years'. In the ingratiation condition (Appendices C and D), flattery and friendliness were difficult to communicate without looking insincere.

For this reason, the flattering remarks were mentioned before the co-manager stated his reason for the email (i.e., the request to support structured training). An example was 'I know you've been working really hard this year. It really shows. Your work has been of top quality'. The control condition did not communicate any influence tactic. Instead, it provided information irrelevant to the issue, such as the co-manager's day. An example was 'There was a lot of traffic today, more than usual. I was quite surprised'. This was to make sure that all three conditions were equally long, yet communicated qualitatively different information.

Strength of rational persuasion. After the first paragraph, the co-manager's e-mail used rational persuasion to influence the participant. The scenario showed either a strong form (Appendix A, C, E) or a weak form (Appendices B, D, F) of rational persuasion. In both cases, the content was between 12 and 13 lines. Each form of rational persuasion was made up of seven arguments adapted from Eagley and Chaiken (1993).

These authors listed specific strong and weak arguments that have been used in past social psychology research (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Petty, Harkins, & Williams, 1980). The original arguments concerned supporting the use of senior comprehensive exams in schools. These were adapted for the context of the current scenario study: In many cases the sentences were essentially the same save a few key words. They remained consistent with Yukl's (2006) definition of rational persuasion.

Although not all aspects of this definition could be satisfied (e.g., concrete evidence for strong arguments), other changes were made. For example, the strong arguments provided statistical evidence and company names. The weak arguments were relatively vague and were much less detailed than the strong arguments. An example of a

strong argument was the statement: "The top 10 fortune 500 companies all use Structured Training to maintain the excellence of their sales staff". An example of a weak argument was the statement "I spoke to Sandra, Frank and some of our other friends in my department and they support the proposal to use Structured Training".

Pilot Study

The pilot study used a convenience sample of 12 participants (i.e., 2 participants per condition). It used acquaintances of the experimenter to calibrate the questionnaires and manipulations for use in the main experiment. The participants were between 23 and 50 years old ($M = 25$, $SD = 4.63$). The design and procedure were the same as the main experiment described above. No participants had prior knowledge of the purpose of the study. At the end of each pilot session, the experimenter informally discussed the study with participants. The experimenter asked (1) whether the questions and scenarios were clear and understandable; (2) what problems might each participant anticipate for future participants in the main study; and (3) participants' general impressions about the scenarios. The quantitative results were not analyzed because the small sample size did not make the statistical information meaningful. The focus was on getting participants' feedback about the questionnaire's content.

As a result, the pilot study led to one major change. Participants felt that the strong rational persuasion condition was not convincing enough. Therefore, this variable was strengthened according to Yukl's (2006) definition of a strong argument. More factual support and logically consistent arguments were added while maintaining the length of all fairly equal. Also it was reassuring that participants did not feel the co-manager was being manipulative, which could have been a confounding variable.

Manipulation Checks

Strength of rational persuasion. As mentioned above, there was a strong and weak form of rational persuasion. The success of this manipulation was tested with a scale adapted from Petty, Schumann, Richman, and Stratham (1993) (Appendix G). The scale was originally used in social psychology persuasion research to rate how strong or weak an argument was. Although the scale was not made with influence tactics in mind, it applies equally well to assessing the strength of rational persuasion. It asked participants to rate the co-manager's arguments on a scale ranging from (-4) weak to (+4) strong.

Perceived influence tactics. Three scales (Appendix G) were used to determine whether participants accurately perceived the intended influence tactics. These scales were given after the manipulation check for strength of rational persuasion. Participants rated the extent to which each tactic was used in the hypothetical scenario. Each question contained one item with four anchored responses. These ranged from 1 (the co-manager did not use this tactic at all) to 4 (the co-manager used this tactic to a great extent). The items were based on Yukl et al. (2005).

All three scales were composed of two items, which were averaged to give an overall score for that tactic. Apprising had the following two items: 'The co-manager explained how you would benefit personally from his/her request about Structured Training' and 'the co-manager explained how complying with the request would help advance your career. It had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.57. The items for rational persuasion were 'the co-manager explained why complying with his/her request is important for the company' and ' the co-manager used factual evidence to show that his/her proposal was

feasible'. It had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.77. The two items for Ingratiation were 'the co-manager complimented or praised you' and 'the co-manager acted very friendly and was respectful of you'. The scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.58.

The low Cronbach's alphas can be partly explained by the fact that the scales only had two items. Alpha is dependent on the number of items that make up the scale, therefore, it is not surprising that low alphas were obtained for ingratiation and apprising. In addition, it should be noted that the scales in this experiment were created based on Yukl's (2006) definitions of each influence tactic. They were not based on extant scales in the literature because the only relevant scales (available from the Influence Behavior Questionnaire or IBQ) were not updated to include distinct items for apprising and rational persuasion.

Measures

Commitment. This study adapted items from Yukl et al.'s (2005) role-play study. They were used as a self-report measure to assess participants' anticipated commitment to the hypothetical manager's request (Appendix H). Participants were given a three-item scale. Each item was rated on a five-point scale and was anchored at each end. The first item asked participants how committed they believe they would be to the manager's request. Possible responses ranged from (1) 'not at all' to (5) 'completely'. Commitment was defined by enthusiasm and a willingness to put extra effort to get the request done. In the second item, participants rated the extent to which they agreed with the statement: 'In the end, I will be completely committed to implement the manager's request'. Possible answers ranged from (1) 'strongly agree' to (5) 'strongly disagree'. This item was reverse scored. Following this question, participants rated a third item that asked them to pick

what they think their specific reaction to the manager's request would be. They had five possible choices:

1. Open resistance (I would refuse to implement the manager's request)
2. Passive Resistance (I would agree to think about it some more but not inclined to do it)
3. Indecision (I would not be ready to decide yet. I would want more time to think about it)
4. Compliance (I would agree to do it but not enthusiastic. I would only make minimum effort)
5. Commitment (I would be enthusiastic about the change. I would be willing to make a strong effort to implement it)

The answers to these three questions were averaged together to obtain one overall commitment score (Appendix H). This scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.66[3].

Elaboration. This measure was based on the thought-listing technique (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). Participants were given three minutes to list the thoughts they had while reading the hypothetical scenario. They were given 22 empty boxes (Appendix I). Each box served to write one thought. Participants were told that grammar and spelling were not important. No explicit instructions were given to write in one's mother tongue as opposed to English. As a result, all participants wrote in English, regardless of whether it was their first, second or third language.

[3] Analyses showed that the scale's Cronbach's alpha rose to 0.75 (a much more acceptable value) when item 2 was removed form the commitment scale. However, the statistical tests' results did not change when the two-item version of the commitment scale was used. Therefore, all three items were kept in order to maintain the integrity of the commitment scale.

After participants listed their thoughts, they were instructed to go back and classify those thoughts as either supporting the co-manager's arguments, neutral/irrelevant, or opposed to the manager's arguments (See Appendix H). The thought index was the main indicator of the extent of elaboration (i.e., more thoughts relevant to the issue).

The scoring procedure and operationalization of elaboration were taken from Cacioppo and Petty (1981). Elaboration was defined as the total number of relevant thoughts (i.e., thoughts with a positive or negative sign in the circular space provided) that the participants listed. Irrelevant thoughts were those marked with a zero in the circular space. A higher number of relevant thoughts meant that a participant elaborated more than one who listed a lower number of relevant thoughts. An example of a positive thought was "The new training program will likely yield a large number of financial benefits for the firm". An example of a negative thought was "The co-manager only listed the advantages, but no disadvantages of the new program" An example of an irrelevant thought was " I appreciate the co-manager telling me about the meetings". In total there were 397 relevant thoughts (231 positive and 166 negative thoughts). Each participant had an average of 3.94 relevant thoughts ($SD = 1.58$). The minimum number of recorded relevant thoughts was zero and the maximum was 8.

The polarity of the participants' thoughts (i.e., whether they were favorable or unfavorable to the co-manager's e-mail) was considered and analyzed. However, because the results were non-significant the measure of commitment (Appendix H) described in the previous section was used instead. This measure comes from the influence tactic literature, and assesses an individual's intentions to carry out the co-manager's request. It

replaced the polarity of thoughts in to root the model from Figure 1 further in the influence tactic literature.

Given this, the polarity of thoughts was calculated with the following formula: (number of positive thoughts – number of negative thoughts) / total number of relevant thoughts. Therefore, this formula calculates what percentage of the participants' thoughts is positive or negative. This way, it accounts for individual differences in the total number of thoughts one is able to write in the allotted time. Because, this measure was replaced by the measure of commitment, the thought listing technique was only used to measure the extent of elaboration. That is, the goal was only to know how many relevant thoughts participants had about the issue, not whether they agreed or disagreed with the co-manager.

As a result, no attempt was made to see whether the written thought matched the plus, negative, or zero symbol the participant ascribed it. It was assumed that the participants best understood what they meant in each box. This was in line with Cacioppo and Petty's (1981) discussion. However, the experimenter did use the following decision rule for special cases. If the circular space was left empty then the experimenter himself read the thought in question and ascribed a plus, minus or zero sign himself. This occurred twice overall. In addition, some participants ascribed both a negative and a plus sign to the same thought[4]. In these cases, this thought counted as two instead of one because it was assumed that both the favorable and unfavorable aspects should be separated into different thoughts. This happened three times overall.

[4] Participants never ascribed a zero and a plus/minus sign

Exploratory Measure

The following measure was exploratory because it was not part of the hypotheses. It was included to gain extra information that might help explain the results of the main hypotheses.

Legitimate power. Legitimate power (Appendix I) was adapted from Hinkin and Schreisheim (1989). It referred to the target's perception that the agent had the right and authority to influence the target and that the target must do what he or she says. French and Raven (1959) defined power as an agent's "maximum potential ability to influence [the target]" (p.152). Power and influence are two distinct concepts. Influence is the actual psychological change that happens in a target, while power is the potential to exert that influence. An example of a statement describing legitimate power was: "My co-manager can make me feel that I have commitments to meet". Participants were asked to rate the extent to which the co-manager in the hypothetical scenario performed each behavior. This scale was composed of four items. Ratings of the statements were averaged together to give a final score for that power base. This scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.76.

Procedure

At the beginning of the experiment participants were told that the study was about relations between co-workers. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. Random assignment was used to equally distribute individuals across conditions. Prior to reading the hypothetical scenario, they filled out a consent form (Appendix J). They then read one of six possible hypothetical scenarios (Appendices A, B, C, D, E, F,).

Once read, participants turned in the scenario in exchange for a package containing questionnaires. This package measured the two dependent variables elaboration and degree of commitment. The first measure was the thought listing technique (Appendix K), which assessed the amount of scrutiny (elaboration) participants gave to the scenario. The second measure assessed participants' overall commitment (Appendix H). These measures were followed by the two manipulation checks (Appendix G) assessing whether participants perceived (1) differences in the strength of rational persuasion and (2) differences between the influence tactics used prior to rational persuasion. Participants were then given one exploratory scale assessing perceived legitimate power (Appendix I). Participants then filled out a demographic questionnaire (Appendix L). The total package took approximately 30 minutes to complete. Testing sessions took place either in groups or alone. Group sizes depended on room availability and the number of participants that registered for each testing session. The sessions were booked as an appointment with the experimenter at a convenient time. After the packages were completed participants were fully debriefed about the nature of the study (Appendix M).

Results

Data Cleansing

Missing data. Two scales in this study contained missing data. A participant's score on a given scale was omitted from the study according to the following decision rules: (1) A score for scales with one to three items was not computed if more than one item was missing and (2) a score for scales with four items was not computed if two or more items were missing. This study had six scales with one to three items. These were the thought listing technique (one item), overall commitment (three items), argument strength (one item), perceived rational persuasion (two items), apprising (two items), and ingratiation (two items). Legitimate power had four items.

Two participants had one item missing. One participant had one item missing for the overall commitment scale. This score was calculated. One participant did not complete the thought listing technique; this participant was excluded. Therefore, only one participant was eliminated from the sample and was not included in any of the analyses.

Outliers. Univariate outliers were identified using z-scores. A participant was considered an outlier on a specific variable if the z-score for that variable was above 3.29 or below -3.29. Based on this decision rule, one outlier was found for the number of relevant thoughts. This participant was removed from the sample. No other outliers were found. After the above participants were eliminated, the final sample for this study totaled 101.

Test of Statistical Assumptions

There were two sets of main analyses: one for the manipulation checks and one for the main hypotheses. The manipulation checks were tested with a MANOVA while

the main hypotheses were tested with one ANOVA, two t-tests and two correlations. However, before performing these analyses, the statistical assumptions of each test were examined. If the assumptions were violated, steps were taken to correct the violations. Given the design of this experiment, independence of observations and random sampling assumptions were satisfied. The other assumptions were checked for violations.

A correlation assumes that (1) the distribution of each variable is normal; (2) variances are homogeneous; and (3) the correlation is linear. The ANOVA and t-test assume that (1) observations are independent; (2) each variable is normally distributed; (3) random sampling was used; and (4) variances are homogeneous. The MANOVA carries the same 4 assumptions as the ANOVA but also assumes that (5) covariance is homogenous (this assumption only applies to the MANOVA because it is a multivariate analysis).

Normality. All the statistical analyses used in this study assume that the data are normally distributed. To test this assumption, the skewness and kurtosis of the variables were examined. Specifically, for each variable, the skewness statistic was divided by its standard error to yield a z-score. Similarly, the kurtosis statistic was divided by its standard error to yield a z-score for kurtosis. A z-score greater than |3.29| (p <0.001) was considered to violate the assumption of normality. This is a very conservative cut-off score. Only perceived argument strength violated normality: Skewness z-score=-5.39, SE =0.24; Kurtosis z-score =3.56, SE =0.48.

Homogeneity of variance. This assumption applies to all the statistical tests used in this study. It was tested with Levene's test of homogeneity of variance. A variable was said to violate this assumption if $p < .05$. This meant that the null hypothesis that the

variances were equal was rejected. A p-value greater than .05 supported the null-hypothesis that the variances were not significantly different from each other. For the manipulation checks, only perceived argument strength violated this assumption, p= .001. For the tests of the main hypotheses, no variables violated this assumption.

Homogeneity of covariance. This is the multivariate counterpart to the homogeneity of variance and applies only to the MANOVA. It was tested using Box's M and did not satisfy the assumption, $p = 0.002$. Because the p-level was less than 0.05 the null hypothesis that the covariance were equal was rejected.

Data Transformation

For the manipulation checks, only perceived argument strength was transformed to restore the variable to normality. Several recommended transformations were performed as part of a trial and error process[5] recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). The transformation which best restored this variable to normality (i.e., the Kurtosis and Skewness z-scores that were closest to zero) was used in the analyses.

Perceived argument strength was negatively skewed (Skewness =-5.29, *SE* =0.24) and moderately peaked (Kurtosis z-score =3.14, *SE* =0.472). The transformation log10(5-X) improved normality. The transformed variable was normally distributed. It must be noted that the transformation log10(5-X) reflected the direction of the variable. That is, because perceived argument strength was negatively skewed, a new variable was

[5] Tabachnick and Fidell (2001, p. 83) recommend six different transformations. When the variable's distribution is positively skewed the authors suggest calculating 1) $\sqrt{(x)}$; 2) log10(X+C); or 3) 1/(X+C). Where X is the value of the variable in question and C is a constant that is added to the variable in order to make the smallest score 1. C is used only when the variable's scores include zero. When the variable's distribution is negatively skewed one should use 1) $\sqrt{(K-x)}$; 2) log10(K-X); or 3) 1/(K-X). Like C, K is a constant such that when X is subtracted, the smallest score is 1.

created subtracting each score from a constant (in this case the appropriate constant is 5) larger than all the possible scores for that variable. This action reflects the direction of the original variable. It also means that when one interprets the relationship between the means of the transformed variable, the interpretation is opposite of the original non-transformed variable.

Assumption of equal covariance. As for the hypothesis tests, the Box's M was performed again using transformed perceived argument strength in place of the original variable. With the original variable, the assumption of equal covariance was violated. However, with the transformed variable, the new Box's M yielded a p-value of = .21. Therefore, using transformed perceived argument strength, one failed to reject the null-hypothesis that the variables in the MANOVA for the hypothesis tests have equal covariances.

General conclusion. The above discussion showed that the transformation restored the variable to normality. However, the MANOVA for manipulation checks violated the assumption of equal covariances.

Manipulation Checks

The manipulation checks were tested with a 3x2 between-subjects MANOVA. There were four dependent variables: perceived use of rational persuasion, perceived ingratiation, perceived apprising and perceived strength of rational persuasion (transformed)[6]. The independent variables were influence tactic (ingratiation, apprising, control) and argument strength (strong and weak). Table 3 shows the effects of influence

[6] The perceived use and the perceived strength of rational persuasion are two distinct dependant variables. The former is about whether rational persuasion is being used or not. The latter is about how strong or weak the rational persuasion tactic is.

tactic condition on participants' perceptions of independent variable. The table shows the means and standard deviations of participants' ratings of the perceived influence tactics (i.e., perceived ingratiation, perceived apprising) and argument strength (strong and weak) across experimental conditions. Therefore, it shows how participants in each experimental condition rated the extent to which they perceived the use of apprising, ingratiation, and strong and weak rational persuasion. In addition, Table 4 shows the MANOVA results of the manipulation checks.

For the MANOVA the total N was 101 participants. Although the data were previously transformed, the assumption of equal covariance was still violated. The Box's M test for equality of covariance gave p=.05, which rejects the null hypothesis. In addition, the Levene's Test showed that transformed perceived argument strength variable still possessed unequal variances, p = .03, which violates the assumption of equal variances. As a solution to both violations, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend using a more stringent α level. Because the violation is moderate, they suggest using α = .025. Therefore, for all analyses in the MANOVA for manipulation checks, α = .025 was used. The MANOVA's Wilk's lambdas (see Table 4) were as follows: influence tactic, $F(8, 92) = 19.98$, $p < .001$ argument strength, $F(4, 184) = 8.57$, $p < .001$; influence tactic by argument strength, $F(8, 184) = 0.64$, $p = .74$. This means that only influence tactic and argument strength had significant effects on one or more of the dependent variables. Table 4 shows which specific dependent variables had significant results. There was a main effect of influence tactic on perceived apprising $F(2, 98) = 30.66$, $p < 0.001$, and perceived ingratiation, $F(2, 98) = 33.07$, $p < .001$.

Table 3

Participant Ratings of Perceived Tactics and Perceived Argument Strength Across Experimental Conditions

Strength of Rational Persuasion	Apprising Condition		Ingratiation Condition		Control Condition		Total	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
				Perceived Apprising				
Strong	3.26	0.77	2.12	0.76	2.06	0.86	2.48	0.96
Weak	3.53	0.51	2.07	0.86	2.17	0.87	2.60	1.01
Total	3.40_{cd}	0.66	2.10_{c}	0.80	2.11_{d}	0.85	2.54	0.98
				Perceived Ingratiation				
Strong	2.26	0.81	3.16	0.77	2.11	0.50	2.49	0.83
Weak	2.29	0.66	3.53	0.58	2.06	0.66	2.58	0.89
Total	2.28_{a}	0.73	3.34_{ab}	0.70	2.08_{b}	0.58	2.53	0.86
				Perceived Argument Strength (transformed)				
Strong	0.47	0.17	0.55	0.17	0.37	0.22	0.42	0.17_{e}
Weak	0.57	0.20	0.49	0.15	0.58	0.27	0.57	0.21_{e}
Total	0.52	0.19	0.49	0.15	0.48	0.26	0.49	0.20

Note. The values represent the mean ratings of the extent to which participants believed each tactic was used. Cells with the same subscript are significantly different from each other. Subscript 'a' means that perceived ingratiation in the ingratiation condition was significantly different from perceived ingratiation in the apprising condition. Subscript 'b' means that perceived ingratiation in the ingratiation condition was significantly different from perceived ingratiation in the control condition. Subscript 'c' means that perceived apprising in the apprising condition was significantly different from perceived apprising in the ingratiation condition. Subscript 'd' means that perceived in the apprising condition was significantly different from perceived apprising in the control condition. The relationships described by each subscript were all significant at $p < .001$. Subscript 'e' means that perceived argument strength was significantly different between the weak and strong condition. Because of the transformation used for perceived argument strength the values must be interpreted as follows: lower values mean that participants perceived the argument to be strong and larger values mean that participants perceived the arguments to be weak.

Table 4

Summary of 3x2 MANOVA for Manipulation Checks

Source	*df*	*F*	η^2	*p*
	Between Subjects			
Influence Tactic (IT)				
Wilk's Lamba	8	19.98**		.000
Perceived rational persuasion	2	1.94	.97	.15
Perceived apprising	2	30.66**	18.85	.000
Perceived ingratiation	2	33.07**	14.94	.000
Perceived argument strength (transformed)	2	0.43	.02	.65
Argument Strength (AS)				
Wilk's Lamba	4	8.57**		.000
Perceived rational persuasion	1	26.68**	13.26	.000
Perceived apprising	1	0.46	.28	.50
Perceived ingratiation	1	0.76	.34	.36
Perceived argument strength (transformed)	1	12.95*	.50	.00
IT X AS				
Wilk's Lamba	8	0.64		.74
Perceived rational persuasion	2	0.18	.09	.84
Perceived apprising	2	0.34	.21	.71
Perceived ingratiation	2	0.95	.43	.39
Perceived argument strength (transformed)	2	o.64	.03	.53
Error				
Perceived rational persuasion	95		.50	
Perceived apprising	95		.62	
Perceived ingratiation	95		.45	
Perceived argument strength (transformed)	95		.04	

* $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$

Post-hoc analyses were performed to identify the source of each main effect. Table 3 shows the effect of influence tactic condition on participants' perceptions of each tactic. The Tukey HSD Post-Hoc analysis revealed that perceived ingratiation and perceived apprising were accurate across the three influence tactic conditions. In the ingratiation condition participants rated perceived ingratiation (M =3.34, SD =0.70) significantly higher than participants in the apprising condition[7] (M =2.28, SD =0.73, $p <$ .001) and participants in the control condition[8] (M =2.08, SD =0.58, $p <$ .001).

In the apprising condition, participants rated perceived apprising (M = 3.40, SD =0.66) significantly higher than those in the ingratiation condition[9] (M =2.10, SD =0.80, $p <$ .001) and those in the control condition[10] (M =2.11, SD =0.85, $p <$ .001). Therefore, participants perceived apprising higher in the apprising condition than did participants from the ingratiation and control conditions. The MANOVA showed that influence tactic condition did not affect perceived rational persuasion. This was expected because rational persuasion was used equally in all the conditions. Therefore, no difference in ratings was expected. The analyses supported this by showing non-significant results. Participants saw the same amount of rational persuasion being used in each experimental condition.

The MANOVA also tested whether the manipulation of the strength of rational persuasion was successful. Table 4 shows that there was a main effect of argument strength on perceived rational persuasion, $F(1, 99) = 26.68$, $p <$ .001 and on perceived argument strength, $F(1, 99) = 12.95$, $p <$0.01. As a main effect, perceived argument strength was significantly affected by argument strength condition. Participants who were

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[7] This relationship is represented by subscript a in Table 3
[8] This relationship is represented by subscript b in Table 3
[9] This relationship is represented by subscript c in Table 3
[10] This relationship is represented by subscript d in Table 3

in the weak condition gave significantly lower ratings (M =0.42, SD = 0.17) than those in the strong condition (M =0.57, SD = 0.21). This means that participants in the strong argument condition saw the arguments as qualitatively stronger than participants in the weak condition. In addition, argument strength also significantly affected perceived rational persuasion. Participants perceived more rational persuasion in the strong condition (M = 3.40, SD = 0.61) than in the weak condition (M =2.67, SD =0.79).

We can conclude that the intended manipulations were successful. Participants saw a difference in the influence tactic conditions and in the strength of rational persuasion. Furthermore, the influence tactic condition did not affect how participants rated the strength of the rational persuasion. This means that the strong and weak conditions were perceived consistently regardless of the influence tactic condition. An interesting outcome was that the strong argument condition was perceived as using more rational persuasion than the weak condition. This does not influence the effectiveness of the manipulations. However, possible explanations for this outcome will be considered in the discussion.

Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 stated that participants presented with 2 tactics would commit more to the request than participants presented with only one tactic. To investigate this hypothesis, a t-test was conducted with the number of influence tactics as the independent variable and overall commitment as the dependent variable. The result was not significant ($t(99) = 1.81, p = .07$) and therefore Hypothesis 1 was not supported. These results meant that the conditions with one tactic (M = 3.55, SD = 0.86) or two tactics (M = 3.25, SD =

0.74) were equally effective in gaining commitment. This contradicted Hypothesis 1 that two tactics would be more effective.

Hypothesis 2 stated that participants first exposed to apprising would show greater argument scrutiny (elaboration) than would participants first exposed to ingratiation or the control (neutral) condition. This hypothesis was tested with a one-way ANOVA. The number of issue relevant thoughts was the dependent variable and influence tactic condition was the independent variable. The results were not significant, $F(2, 98) = 1.72, p = .18$, and did not support Hypothesis 2. The results indicate that participants elaborated equally across all three influence tactic conditions: Apprising, $M = 3.29$, $SD = 0.85$; Ingratiation, $M = 3.20$, $SD = 0.61$; Control, $M = 3.55$, $SD = 0.14$) Therefore, the influence tactics that preceded rational persuasion did not change the extent of elaboration.

Hypothesis 3 stated that participants exposed to strong rational persuasion would show more commitment than participants exposed to weak rational persuasion.
It was tested with a t-test. Argument strength was the independent variable and overall commitment was the dependent variable. The result was significant, $t(99) = 3.47$, $p < .001$ and supported the hypothesis. The strong condition ($M = 3.61$, $SD = 0.78$) gained greater commitment from participants than did the weak condition ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 0.72$).

Hypothesis 4 stated that argument strength would moderate the relationship between elaboration and commitment such that elaboration would be negatively related to commitment for weak arguments but would be positively related to commitment when the argument was strong. To test this hypothesis two correlations were computed: one

between overall commitment and the number of relevant thoughts in the strong condition ($r = .02, N = 51, p = .43$) and the other between overall commitment and the number of relevant thoughts in the weak condition r=.06, $N = 50, p = .34$). Although both Pearson correlations showed very weak linear relationships, this did not mean that no relationship existed. For example, linear correlations fail when a relationship is U-shaped or logarithmic. Therefore, non-linear equations were also fitted.

For the strong condition the fitted linear equation had an R-square of .00 while a fitted quadratic and cubic equation each had R-squares of .01. For the weak condition the fitted linear equation had an R-square of .00 while a fitted quadratic and cubic equation had R-squares of .02 and .03 respectively. This was strong evidence that neither a linear nor a non-linear relationship existed between the number of relevant thoughts and overall commitment.

The lack of support for Hypotheses 2 and 4 lead to several conclusions about the model presented in Figure 1. First, the influence tactics did not lead to differential elaboration. Secondly, elaboration did not lead to differential commitment. Together, these two results mean that elaboration did not mediate the relationship between influence tactics and commitment.

Exploratory Data Analysis

Legitimate power was examined as an exploratory variable and was screened according to the same decision rules described earlier (i.e., for missing data, outliers and testing statistical assumptions).

Based on these decision rules two participants were removed because of missing data. They were missing two or more of the four items needed to calculate legitimate power. No outliers were found. This gave a total N of 99.

Test of Statistical Assumptions for Exploratory Data

Assumption of normality. Legitimate power (Skewness z-score=-3.47, *SE* =0.24) violated the assumption of normality.

Assumption of equal variance. A variable violates this assumption if $p < .05$. The Levene's test showed that legitimate power ($p < .001$) was in violation. Therefore this variable was transformed in the same way that were the variables in the manipulation checks and hypothesis tests. The transformation that brought legitimate power closest to normality (i.e., the kurtosis and skewness z-scores that were closest to zero) was used.

Transformation. Before the transformation, this variable was very negatively skewed (Skewness z-score =-3.47, *SE* = 0.24) and moderately peaked (Kurtosis z-score =1.72, *SE* =0.481). Only skewness violated the assumption of normality. The variable was improved by the transformation log10(6-X). This new variable approached normality. Furthermore, the transformed legitimate power did not violate the assumption of equal variances. Specifically, the Levene's test was not significant, $p = .05$.

Post-hoc Analyses

This section examines how perceived legitimate power could be used as an alternative explanation for the current findings. Although this study focused on lateral influence, legitimate power was measured to be certain that participants did not infer unwanted conclusions about the co-worker in each experimental condition.

Specifically, one could argue that differences in the information that the co-manager provided in each influence tactic or argument strength condition might have affected participants' perception of the co-manager's legitimate power. For example, it is possible that the co-manager's provision of extra facts and detailed information in the strong argument condition might lead participants to perceive the co-manager as having greater legitimate power than did participants in the weak condition. If this happened, then the participants in the strong condition might have committed to the co-manager simply because they perceived a greater power difference. These extra inferences could have counteracted this study's attempt to communicate a lateral relationship. Therefore, perceived legitimate power was measured to keep track of these unwanted inferences by participants.

This alternative explanation was examined with a two-way ANOVA. Legitimate power was the dependent variable and influence tactic condition and argument strength were the two independent variables. The results were not significant. There was no main effect of influence tactic, $F(2, 93) = 1.95, p = .15$, or argument strength, $F(1, 93) = 0.33$, $p = .59$, on legitimate power. This means that participants in each condition perceived the co-manager as having the same level of authority and that their decision to commit cannot be explained by a perceived power difference. Therefore, legitimate power was discounted as a potential alternative explanation.

Discussion

This thesis attempted to answer several questions. The primary question was "what combination of influence tactics is most likely to gain employee commitment?" Secondary questions were (1) Do the same proactive tactics work in all situations? and (2) How many proactive tactics should peers use? This thesis sought to answer these questions with a scenario study and used ELM to derive hypotheses about how to create influence tactic combinations. The results showed that how strong one's argument is might be more important than what influence tactics one uses in conjunction with that argument. This means that, in some situations, rational persuasion alone will be enough to gain commitment while other tactics used to enhance it will be a waste of one's efforts.

Of the four hypotheses, only one was supported: that the strong form of rational persuasion would gain more commitment regardless of whether ingratiation, apprising or neutral dialogue was used. Ingratiation and apprising did not affect elaboration (Hypothesis 2), nor was elaboration related to commitment (Hypothesis 4). Furthermore, the number of tactics used did not affect commitment (Hypothesis 1). In simple terms, this study's results imply the following: An agent who (1) seeks to immediately persuade a target in his or her first influence attempt and (2) uses rational persuasion as the central tactic should focus on the strength of one's arguments rather than "buttering up" the target with initial proactive tactics. It also implies that rational persuasion, particularly in its strong form, is an effective way to convince a target. This is in line with the current literature about rational persuasion's effectiveness.

This study focused on the immediate persuasion of a target. Its main goal was to use ELM's propositions to optimize the use of rational persuasion by preceding it with

different tactics. It was only the second study after Barry and Shapiro (1992) to experimentally investigate influence tactic combinations. It also addressed some of the concerns researchers have raised about causality (e.g., Emans et al., 2003; Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Except for Barry and Shapiro (1992), the handful of studies on proactive tactic combinations has relied on influence incidents and field surveys. This design makes it difficult to confidently infer causality. Barry and Shapiro (1992) also used ELM, but their study was superficial and lacked detail in its application. This study's conclusions added some interesting ideas to what Barry and Shapiro (1992) found; their study had two main findings.

Barry and Shapiro found that including ingratiation in an influence attempt increases the likelihood of compliance. This was directly contradicted by the current study, which found that ingratiation did not improve the use of rational persuasion. Therefore, ingratiation does not necessarily increase compliance. This difference might be explained by the way in which ingratiation was employed.

In the current study, ingratiation was limited to one paragraph at the beginning of the scenario, followed by rational persuasion in another paragraph. In Barry and Shapiro (1992), ingratiation was used throughout the hypothetical scenario by softening the agent's language. For example, phrases such as "I think you can help" and "I'd really appreciate your help" were peppered throughout the influence attempt. This may have increased the effectiveness of ingratiation by mixing it with the agent's explanations rather than keeping it separate. This is an interesting difference in the use of an influence tactic that should be explored in future research. In using ELM, this thesis portrayed influence tactics as a way to prime a target to one's request. Instead, Barry and Shapiro's

(1992) scenarios mixed tactics together so that they were not as easily separable by the target. Recognizing this difference may be a useful way to categorize an agent's use of influence tactics. It may also be a trait that distinguishes more effective agents from less effective ones.

The differences between Barry and Shapiro (1992) and the current thesis highlights the current state of the proactive tactic research; the lack of a unified approach to defining and using proactive tactics impedes researchers from confidently comparing results across studies. Currently, the only factor that helps unify the literature is the categorization of tactics into hard, soft or rational. Although there exist different taxonomies of specific proactive tactics (Yukl, 2006), these three distinct categories[11] help us broadly compare tactics (Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985; Yukl et al., 2005). Rational tactics refer to the use of some form of logic to persuade a target. This includes rational persuasion, apprising and some forms of exchange. Soft tactics are distinct from rational tactics. They do not rely on coercion or authority as their main source of influence. Instead, they use personal power over position power to target a person's value system and ambitions (Emans et al., 2003). This includes tactics such as ingratiation, inspirational appeal, consultation, personal appeals, and collaboration. Whereas soft tactics allow the target to freely resist or comply/commit, hard tactics do not. They use power and authority as their source of influence. This includes pressure, legitimating, and some forms of coalition and exchange (see Table 1 for tactic definitions).

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[11] One needs to remember that these categorizations are flexible. Depending on how they are used, some tactics that are usually soft can be turned into hard tactics. For example, sarcasm is one way to make a soft tactic look like a hard tactic.

The main problem for the literature is that using several tactics that are individually effective does not mean that their combination will also be effective. When it comes to combining influence tactics, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Emans et al.'s (2003) study demonstrates this. The authors criticized past research which showed that hard tactics were individually less effective than soft tactics (e.g., Yukl & Falbe, 1992). Their study surveyed police stations in Spain. The frequency of hard tactics decreased compliance when police officers combined them with a seldom-to-occasional use of soft and rational tactics. However, the frequency of hard tactics had a positive effect when combined with the frequent use of soft and rational tactics. The study was correlational and so did not establish causality. However, it still showed that hard tactics, when used appropriately, can enhance the overall effect of other influence tactics. Unfortunately, this finding does not suggest how to sequence or combine specific tactics. Instead, it tells us that there may exist hundreds of compatible combinations between each of the three categories defined earlier. The generality of these conclusions is a recurring problem in proactive tactic combination research. This is compounded by the fact that only a handful of studies has investigated proactive tactic combinations (Barry & Shapiro, 1992; Case et al., 1988; Emans et al., 2003; Falbe & Yukl, 1992). As a result very little is known about the interactions that exist when using two or more tactics simultaneously (Yukl et al., 2005).

This thesis' conclusions are partly consistent with the proactive tactic literature, which states that adding more tactics does not necessarily increase effectiveness. However, the lack of support for Hypothesis 1 is inconsistent with Case et al.'s (1988) and Falbe and Yukl's (1992) findings that using more proactive tactics is associated with

a greater likelihood of commitment. Therefore, it is slowly becoming clear that the nature of each proactive tactic must be taken into account to make an effective combination.

As for the persuasion literature from social psychology, this study only supported ELM's contention that stronger arguments are generally more persuasive than weaker arguments (Hypothesis 3). This contention has been confirmed in the literature (e.g., Petty, Heesacker & Hughes, 1997; Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2006). However, the lack of support for Hypotheses 2 and 4 was not consistent with the persuasion literature. This thesis found no relationship between the target's elaboration and the target's commitment (Hypothesis 4) nor between influence tactics and elaboration (Hypothesis 2). To explain this lack of support, one might speculate that the manipulation of ingratiation and apprising was not strong enough. That is, apprising may not have established enough personal responsibility, or ingratiation may not have manipulated mood in the way desired. However, one can also reason that the subject of the hypothetical scenario was too unfamiliar for students and not detailed enough to immerse themselves to the extent needed to affect their elaboration likelihood.

Given this, one could also argue that participants elaborated more than expected because they were receiving percentage points for their participation (i.e., they were part of a participant pool). They might have felt more obliged to elaborate on the scenario in return for academic grades. However, even if this were the case, the apprising condition still did not succeed in elevating elaboration beyond this level. Therefore, although this explanation is conceivable it does not help explain why apprising did not succeed. Other explanations are necessary.

Practical Implications

Types of influence attempts. This study's implications are limited as they only answer a small part of the main research question "what proactive influence tactic combinations are most likely to gain compliance". That is because the purpose of this study was to examine how to enhance the effectiveness of rational persuasion. This study's results only tell us about what can happen when rational persuasion comes second in a two-tactic influence attempt. It does not tell us about what will occur if rational persuasion were used first (i.e., if ingratiation or apprising is used after rational persuasion). Nor does it tell one about how influence attempts with tactics other than rational persuasion will compare. Remember that each tactic in the taxonomy (Table 1) can be used as a central tactic in an influence attempt. This means that hundreds upon hundreds of combinations can be made. Therefore, at this early stage in the literature, this study's results represent such a small part of the research question that one cannot generalize beyond rational persuasion with much conviction. While the literature concludes that rational persuasion is the most effective proactive tactic (Yukl, 2006), it is possible that some combinations are more effective without it. However, this is left open for future research to explore.

Given the lack of support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, one does not know if apprising can be used to increase a target's elaboration. Because this was an exploratory study, the absence of significant results should not be taken as proof that there is no effect. The previous body of literature suggests that the underlying idea behind ingratiation and apprising is consistent with ELM's predictions that personal relevance

and mood play a role in persuasion. Therefore, exploration of their role as initial proactive tactics is still justified.

Given this, one should also be careful not to rule out the possibility that elaboration does not have to be increased immediately. It can be done over time, and through multiple encounters with the target. Therefore, it is possible that proactive tactics like apprising should only be used after the first influence attempt. It is also possible that ingratiation does not show an immediate effect but instead that its effect is compounded over multiple occasions. This suggests some proactive tactics must be employed differently to have an observable effect.

The time dimension of influence. The current study did not examine the temporal dimension of influence. Because of this study's design, one's conclusions must be limited to first-time influence attempts with an agent. One can only infer that rational persuasion is most effective in its strong form. However, for this study to be truly useful for employees, one needs information about how to use influence tactics over multiple encounters. For example, Yukl (2006) notes that while ingratiation can be effective, it can be detrimental if used right before making a request. It may not look genuine in the eyes of the target and the agent risks appearing manipulative and the target will feel used. As a result, Yukl suggests that ingratiation is better suited for the long-term so as to build a more positive relationship with the target. ELM also states that repetition of one's arguments (e.g., through multiple encounters) gives a target more opportunity to elaborate on those arguments. Therefore, ELM implies that time is an important factor in the persuasion process. The current study inherently focused on immediate short-term influence attempts. However, as suggested above, an agent can also spread their

persuasion efforts over a period of time. For such a longitudinal influence attempt, the tactic-sequence needed to make tactics most effective may be different from the sequencing that should be used in a one-time immediate influence episode.

Limitations

Sample size. Several structural issues temper the conclusions one draws from this study. Of these, the study's small sample size (15 to 18 participants per condition) should make one wary of the non-significant results. It is possible that with a larger sample size, some statistical differences may have been found. However, it is important to note that the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not in the expected directions. In fact, for Hypothesis 1, the one-tactic conditions showed greater participant commitment than the two-tactic conditions. The opposite direction was expected. For Hypothesis 2, the results were partly in the expected direction. The apprising and ingratiation conditions yielded the expected results. However, the control condition was expected to evoke less elaboration than apprising. Instead, it turned out to evoke more elaboration. Specifically, the control condition showed the most elaboration, followed by the apprising and ingratiation conditions respectively. Whether these results will be found with larger sample sizes remains to be seen. It is a concern that should be addressed in future research.

Low reliabilities. The analyses showed that the measures of perceived apprising, perceived rational persuasion and commitment had relatively low reliabilities of 0.57, 0.58, and 0.66 respectively. This meant that there was a low correlation between the items used for each measure. However, one must remember that alpha depends on the number of items in each scale. Given that perceived apprising (alpha =.57) and perceived rational persuasion (alpha = .58) had only 2 items each, it is understandable that they yielded low

alphas because alpha rises with the number of the items used in each measure. Therefore, one way to increase the reliability is to increase the number of items in the scale (e.g., by using 10 items instead of 2 items). Another method would be to pilot test a pool of items for each measure and then choose those items that yield the best reliability.

Of course, obtaining a higher alpha is important so that one is more certain that the items measure the same intended construct. However, for this study, the measures still yielded significant results. This showed that the manipulations were successful even though low reliabilities limit the ability to find significance. The fact that the measures were based on the definitions of apprising and rational persuasion also strengthens confidence that the measures were successful and relevant. In the end, for the purpose of this study, the low reliabilities of the manipulation checks are a concern but do not undermine the main findings.

By contrast, the measure of commitment posed a greater problem. It was the main measure for the study's hypotheses yet yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .66. While this can be worrisome, analyses showed that it did not affect the final results. Specifically, the Cronbach's alpha rose to .75 when item 2 was removed from the commitment scale (see Appendix H). This version of the scale did not change the statistical significance of the results. This implied that the integrity of the scale was still maintained and the low alpha could not explain the non-significant outcomes for the hypotheses.

The effect of item 2 on the Cronbach's alpha (i.e., the change from 0.66 to 0.75 when item 2 was removed) can be explained as follows. It is the only item in the commitment scale that was reverse scored. The different anchors for that item made it more likely to be misread by participants. Appendix H shows that items 1 and 3 used '5'

to reflect higher commitment and '1' to reflect less commitment. Item 2 came between these items and used the opposite anchors. While, this offers one potential reason for the low alpha, the overall statistical results do not appear to have been affected.

The nature of scenario studies. In addition to the above discussion, the content of the scenarios is likely the main concern because using hypothetical scenarios limits the amount of information that a target will usually receive in a face-to-face influence attempt. Some examples are the agent's tone of voice (e.g., sarcasm) or other nonverbal behaviors such as smiling, pleasant facial expressions or eye contact. Such cues have been shown to influence how an individual interprets information (Burgoon, Dunbar, & Segrin, 2002). For example Burgoon, Birk, and Pfau (1990) found that speakers with more fluent speech and facial expressiveness were perceived as more persuasive and credible than speakers without these features. This makes one realize that there is more to persuasion than can be captured through a hypothetical scenario study.

Another feature that this scenario study lacked was the possibility of future encounters between agent and target. According to ELM, elaboration likelihood can be both situationally and internally induced. Internal factors refer to individual differences such as the target's ability to analyze arguments, their prior knowledge of the issue or how much they enjoy thinking critically (i.e., their need for cognition). Situational factors are characteristics of the persuasion situation that can be manipulated by the agent to alter the extent or direction of elaboration. Both situational and internal factors are subject to change over multiple encounters. A target may learn more about an issue between an agent's first and second influence attempt. At the same time, both peripheral and central information becomes compounded with each successive encounter with a target. This was

absent from the current scenario study and is an important limitation that does not allow one to generalize to future encounters based on this study alone.

In addition, issues such as one's first impressions of the agent likely affected participants' decisions. As ELM stated, the external information that one has about the influence attempt will affect one's decision to commit, comply or reject the request. Because this scenario represented a first-time encounter for the participants with the co-manager, they did not have much external information to use in their decision-making. This most likely restricted their ability to elaborate on the co-manager's arguments.

Personal relevance for a student sample. In addition to the above drawbacks, the current study gave students a non-personally relevant topic. This limited their ability to respond to the issue based on information they already possessed. Also, their likely lack of work experience also questions the validity of their responses to the scenario. Therefore, this factor probably affected participants' ability to elaborate on the issues in the scenario. Booth-Butterfield and Welbourne (2002) discuss this specific issue. They point out that having considerable knowledge about an issue encourages more elaboration whereas having less knowledge about a topic means that a person needs to rely more on peripheral cues to make a decision if central-route information is not available.

The nature of the sample adds to the likelihood that participants relied on peripheral information. Because the sample consisted mainly of undergraduate students (with a mean age of 20.8 years), one can only generalize to a limited cross-section of the workforce. Being young undergraduate students, the participants necessarily had less work experience to draw on when reacting to the hypothetical co-worker. Therefore, one can argue that they did not have enough experience and knowledge to judge the scenario's

realism or the merits of the co-worker's arguments. In this respect, one can question the degree to which their answers reflected how they would actually react in that situation. However, this does not completely undermine the results. One can still generalize the conclusions to a specific segment of the population: individuals with some experience and knowledge of workplace interactions. Future studies could address this concern by comparing participants with greater work experience to those with less experience. One can explore how work experience affects one's ability to influence others and resist being influenced by peers. In short, the use of a student sample is a more limited but still legitimate source of information because it reflects a specific age group and segment of the workforce.

Suggested improvements. Based on the above limitations, one can suggest several improvements. Firstly, if one continues to use this study's structure, the experimental manipulations need to be strengthened. One will notice that in the scenarios, the length of the rational persuasion paragraph was about twice as long as the paragraph for ingratiation, apprising, and neutral speech. This automatically places more emphasis on rational persuasion, and may explain the lack of significant results. The participants may not have been exposed to each influence tactic long enough in these short paragraphs to be truly affected by ingratiation or apprising. Therefore, future replications of this study should take more care in manipulating the tactics used.

Secondly, the natural limitations of using a scenario study can be countered by turning it into a role-play study. Yukl et al. (2005) used this method successfully to identify the different types of tactics an agent can use. Specifically, they created dyads in which each participant played the role of the agent or target in a scenario about

production workers. Participants were told to use whatever methods they believed useful to influence the target to commit. Experimenters then observed and categorized the tactics that were used. For the purpose of this thesis, Yukl et al.'s (2005) role-play experiment can be structured such that individuals playing the role of the agent are instructed to use specific tactics (e.g., ingratiation followed by rational persuasion) instead of being given carte-blanche. This will introduce the face-to-face aspect missing from the current scenario study. It will also introduce more control in the specific tactics that the agents use. This way, one can examine how an individual actually uses each tactic in a live influence attempt. Such a study can be structured as a repeated or independent measures design. In the independent measures variation, each participant can play the role of the agent only using a specific set of tactics. In a repeated measures variation, the same participant would be instructed to play the role of the agent several times but using different tactics each time. Both variations would allow one to examine how participants' experience changes their use of each tactic.

Future Recommendations

ELM is a theory of persuasion and not a theory of proactive influence. Although the two constructs are very similar, persuasion and proactive influence have been developed under different frameworks. While there is no universally accepted definition of persuasion, the term usually refers to an intentional attempt by an agent at using communication to change an individual's (the persuadee's) behavior/attitude (Dillard & Pfau, 2002). In social psychology, the systematic study of persuasion dates back some seventy years (Miller, 1987). The rich history behind ELM should be seen as a gold mine

of information that proactive influence tactic researchers can use to supplement the paucity of research that exists about proactive influence tactic combinations.

Past social psychology research had focused on three persuasion variables (see Booth-Buterfield & Welbourne, 2002, for discussion): the source of the message (e.g., the persuader's physical attractiveness), the receiver of the message (e.g., how discrepant a persuadee's initial position is from the source's message) and the message itself (e.g., how the message is phrased and expressed). ELM helped integrate this research by focusing on the processes that underlie the effects of the aforementioned variables. As was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, it is these processes that are not properly addressed by Kelman's (1958) or Yukl and Tracey's (1992) model of proactive influence.

The application of ELM to proactive influence should not be seen as a simple repetition of past social psychology research. Instead, it represents the integration of two conceptually similar constructs that have been developed under different paradigms. In social psychology, persuasion falls under the umbrella of social influence. It has garnered much attention and has benefited from numerous theoretical perspectives (see Dillard & Pfau, 2002, for a review). For instance, Robert Cialdini's influential framework describes universal principles that are used to deduce specific persuasive behaviors (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). This contrasts with proactive influence because the specific behaviours themselves are not outlined in Cialdini's framework. For example, the principle of scarcity states that people value items more when they are scarce or not as readily available. Deductively, this means that one can gain greater compliance by explicitly stating that an action, item, or service is available for a limited time only or is a rare event (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). It is this deductive approach that Yukl et al.

(2005) note is necessary to identifying new tactics. However, it is lacking in proactive influence research. That is why integrating ELM represents a first step towards introducing a robust theory into the area. Once done, researchers can identify and evaluate proactive influence tactics more easily and precisely.

Conclusions

This study was the second study after Barry and Shapiro (1992) to experimentally examine influence tactic combinations and went beyond Barry and Shapiro's (1992) analyses. In particular, the main goal of the current study was to optimize the use of rational persuasion by preceding it with different tactics. It found that argument strength did affect participants' commitment. However, the influence tactic condition and number of tactics used did not.

These results shed some light on the current small body of literature on influence tactics. For example, they supported the contention that some influence tactics will not make rational persuasion more effective. The nature of the tactic, and the order in which it is employed must be taken into account. This study's main contribution was theoretical. It is the first study to solely use ELM to derive hypotheses about proactive tactic sequencing. This was in answer to Yukl et al.'s (2005) request to integrate robust theories into the proactive tactic literature. It is this author's hope that the current thesis will stimulate more interest in social psychology such that proactive tactic researchers will mine the wealth of information that persuasion researchers have amassed.

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Appendix A: Hypothetical Scenario - Strong Argument and Apprising

Carefully Read the scenario below.
When you are finished, hand it back to the experimenter.

Assume you are a Human Resource (HR) manager in a manufacturing firm. You have received an email from a co-manager. You both have equal levels of authority. The co-manager once suggested that the department adopt a different training program for all new employees. The program is called Structured-Training. You were reluctant to adopt the program because it would require an overhaul of the current training program, which has not received any complaints against it. If you adopt the new program it will set back your department's work by a few months. In addition, the program will probably require very high costs to implement. This money could be used to hire new employees that are actually needed to fill empty positions.

Yesterday, the co-manager sent you an e-mail about the issue. It says the following:

Hi,

I'm emailing you about adopting the Structured Training Program I mentioned to you a few weeks ago. This is really something that would advance your career by about 3 years. It's an accomplishment that would be noticed by all the managers if you did this. In the past, bonuses for similar achievements have been given out. They've been a minimum of $10, 000. A lot of times a manager is given more authority and not to mention big promotions for things like this. Human Resources is important to the highest managers. If you still have reservations, I found out more:

I've attached 8 studies to this e-mail. The research shows it has many benefits: the program generally leads to 30% lower turnover rates, higher performance and greater job satisfaction overall. The studies also cover structured training at Microsoft and Toyota. In both cases, the average performance scores were at least 50% higher for employees who've done structured training. Our current training program is 25 years old. I think it is dangerous to spend money updating our old system. Structured Training was developed in 2002 by the National Training Association. Our company consultant projected that we would save a minimum of $6 million over the next five years. The program will cost about $700, 000 over 2 years. It would also help drive down costs by 3% annually.. Having said that, if we don't adopt the program we may lose 5 of our biggest clients to competitors who are already using Structured Training.

Given what I have said, I really think we should adopt this program. Think about it and get back to me.

Cheers

There are both pros and cons to the co-manager's proposal. Consider how you would respond/react.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

After reading and understanding the above, please hand it back to the experimenter

Appendix B: Hypothetical Scenario - Weak Argument and Apprising

Carefully Read the scenario below.
When you are finished, hand it back to the experimenter.

Assume you are a Human Resource (HR) manager in a manufacturing firm. You have received an email from a co-manager. You both have equal levels of authority. The co-manager once suggested that the department adopt a different training program for all new employees. The program is called Structured-Training. You were reluctant to adopt the program because it would require an overhaul of the current training program, which has not received any complaints against it. If you adopt the new program it will set back your department's work by a few months. In addition, the program will probably require very high costs to implement. This money could be used to hire new employees that are actually needed to fill empty positions.

Yesterday, the co-manager sent you an e-mail about the issue. It says the following:

Hi,

I'm emailing you about adopting the Structured Training Program I mentioned to you a few weeks ago. This is really something that would advance your career by about 3 years. It's an accomplishment that would be noticed by all the managers if you did this. In the past, bonuses for similar achievements have been given out. They've been a minimum of $10, 000. A lot of times a manager is given more authority and not to mention big promotions for things like this. Human Resources is important to the highest managers. If you still have reservations, I found out more:

I spoke to Sandra, Frank and some of our others in the department and they support the proposal to use Structured Training. Did you know that our boss has gone through Structured Training? This week he got an award for manager of the year. So the benefits the training program has for employees would also accrue for higher-level managers and even lower-level employees. In addition, our current training program is outdated. It does not account for many things that Structured Training includes. In this respect, the new program would help us save in many ways. For example, there is evidence that Structured Training reduces employee turnover while increasing efficiency. It also prepares employees for the practical problems of real life work. There are so many benefits that not using Structured Training program is like stealing from our company. I'm sure the National Training Association would not market the program unless it actually worked.

Given What I have said, I really think we should adopt this program. Think about it and get back to me.

Cheers

There are both pros and cons to the co-manager's proposal. Consider how you would respond/react.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

After reading and understanding the above, please hand it back to the experimenter

Appendix C: Hypothetical Scenario - Strong Argument and Ingratiation

Carefully Read the scenario below.
When you are finished, hand it back to the experimenter.

Assume you are a Human Resource (HR) manager in a manufacturing firm. You have received an email from a co-manager. You both have equal levels of authority. The co-manager once suggested that the department adopt a different training program for all new employees. The program is called Structured-Training. You were reluctant to adopt the program because it would require an overhaul of the current training program, which has not received any complaints against it. If you adopt the new program it will set back your department's work by a few months. In addition, the program will probably require very high costs to implement. This money could be used to hire new employees that are actually needed to fill empty positions.

Yesterday, the co-manager sent you an e-mail about the issue. It says the following:

Hi,

How are you doing? I just wanted to let you know that I see the effort you've been putting into your work lately. It shows. Your work has been of top quality and everyone appreciates it. It's setting a good standard for the rest of us. Especially after the last few reports, the workers and I really trust your judgment. Plus you have a good instinct at training new applicants. That made me think about what I mentioned to you a few weeks ago about the Structured Training Program. Hope you remember what I said. I found out more:

I've attached 8 studies to this e-mail. The research shows it has many benefits: the program generally leads to 30% lower turnover rates, higher performance and greater job satisfaction overall. The studies also cover structured training at Microsoft and Toyota. In both cases, the average performance scores were at least 50% higher for employees who've done structured training. Our current training program is 25 years old. I think it is dangerous to spend money updating our old system. Structured Training was developed in 2002 by the National Training Association. Our company consultant projected that we would save a minimum of $6 million over the next five years. The program will cost about $700, 000 over 2 years. It would also help drive down costs by 3% annually. Having said that, if we don't adopt the program we may lose 5 of our biggest clients to competitors who are already using Structured Training.

Given what I have said, I really think we should adopt this program. Think about it and get back to me.

Cheers.

There are both pros and cons to the co-manager's proposal. Consider how you would respond/react.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

After reading and understanding the above, please hand it back to the experimenter

Appendix D: Hypothetical Scenario - Weak Argument and Ingratiation

Carefully Read the scenario below.
When you are finished, hand it back to the experimenter.

Assume you are a Human Resource (HR) manager in a manufacturing firm. You have received an email from a co-manager. You both have equal levels of authority. The co-manager once suggested that the department adopt a different training program for all new employees. The program is called Structured-Training. You were reluctant to adopt the program because it would require an overhaul of the current training program, which has not received any complaints against it. If you adopt the new program it will set back your department's work by a few months. In addition, the program will probably require very high costs to implement. This money could be used to hire new employees that are actually needed to fill empty positions.

Yesterday, the co-manager sent you an e-mail about the issue. It says the following:

Hi,

How are you doing? I just wanted to let you know that I see the effort you've been putting into your work lately. It shows. Your work has been of top quality and everyone appreciates it. It's setting a good standard for the rest of us. Especially after the last few reports, the workers and I really trust your judgment. Plus you have a good instinct at training new applicants. That made me think about what I mentioned to you a few weeks ago about the Structured Training Program. Hope you remember what I said. I found out more:

I spoke to Sandra, Frank and some of our others in the department and they support the proposal to use Structured Training. Did you know that our boss has gone through Structured Training? This week he got an award for manager of the year. So the benefits the training program has for employees would also accrue for higher-level managers and even lower-level employees. In addition, our current training program is outdated. It does not account for many things that Structured Training includes. In this respect, the new program would help us save in many ways. For example, there is evidence that Structured Training reduces employee turnover while increasing efficiency. It also prepares employees for the practical problems of real life work. There are so many benefits that not using Structured Training program is like stealing from our company. I'm sure the National Training Association would not market the program unless it actually worked.

Given What I have said, I really think we should adopt this program. Think about it and get back to me.

Cheers.

There are both pros and cons to the co-manager's proposal. Consider how you would respond/react.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

After reading and understanding the above, please hand it back to the experimenter

Appendix E: Hypothetical Scenario - Strong Argument and No Influence Tactic

Carefully Read the scenario below.
When you are finished, hand it back to the experimenter.

Assume you are a Human Resource (HR) manager in a manufacturing firm. You have received an email from a co-manager. You both have equal levels of authority. The co-manager once suggested that the department adopt a different training program for all new employees. The program is called Structured-Training. You were reluctant to adopt the program because it would require an overhaul of the current training program, which has not received any complaints against it. If you adopt the new program it will set back your department's work by a few months. In addition, the program will probably require very high costs to implement. This money could be used to hire new employees that are actually needed to fill empty positions.

Yesterday, the co-manager sent you an e-mail about the issue. It says the following:

Hi,

I read the reports and financial data today. Everything seems to be inline. They are ready to be presented to our clients. The secretary wants to remind us that we have two meetings this week in the boardroom. The relevant documents should be in our mailboxes by tomorrow. It should include one package and two brochures. We will be discussing this month's new account. While I went over the documents I remembered that I mentioned the Structured Training Program to you a couple of weeks ago. I hope you remember what I said. I found out more.

I've attached 8 studies to this e-mail. The research shows it has many benefits: the program generally leads to 30% lower turnover rates, higher performance and greater job satisfaction overall. The studies also cover structured training at Microsoft and Toyota. In both cases, the average performance scores were at least 50% higher for employees who've done structured training. Our current training program is 25 years old. I think it is dangerous to spend money updating our old system. Structured Training was developed in 2002 by the National Training Association. Our company consultant projected that we would save a minimum of $6 million over the next five years. The program will cost about $700, 000 over 2 years. It would also help drive down costs by 3% annually. Having said that, if we don't adopt the program we may lose 5 of our biggest clients to competitors who are already using Structured Training.

Given what I have said, I really think we should adopt this program. Think about it and get back to me.

Cheers.

There are both pros and cons to the co-manager's proposal. Consider how you would respond/react.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

After reading and understanding the above, please hand it back to the experimenter

Appendix F: Hypothetical Scenario - Weak Argument and No Influence Tactic

Carefully Read the scenario below.
When you are finished, hand it back to the experimenter.

Assume you are a Human Resource (HR) manager in a manufacturing firm. You have received an email from a co-manager. You both have equal levels of authority. The co-manager once suggested that the department adopt a different training program for all new employees. The program is called Structured-Training. You were reluctant to adopt the program because it would require an overhaul of the current training program, which has not received any complaints against it. If you adopt the new program it will set back your department's work by a few months. In addition, the program will probably require very high costs to implement. This money could be used to hire new employees that are actually needed to fill empty positions.

Yesterday, the co-manager sent you an e-mail about the issue. It says the following:

Hi,

I read the reports and financial data today. Everything seems to be inline. They are ready to be presented to our clients. The secretary wants to remind us that we have two meetings this week in the boardroom. The relevant documents should be in our mailboxes by tomorrow. It should include one package and two brochures. We will be discussing this month's new account. While I went over the documents I remembered that I mentioned the Structured Training Program to you a couple of weeks ago. I hope you remember what I said. I found out more.

I spoke to Sandra, Frank and some of our others in the department and they support the proposal to use Structured Training. Did you know that our boss has gone through Structured Training? This week he got an award for manager of the year. So the benefits the training program has for employees would also accrue for higher-level managers and even lower-level employees. In addition, our current training program is outdated. It does not account for many things that Structured Training includes. In this respect, the new program would help us save in many ways. For example, there is evidence that Structured Training reduces employee turnover while increasing efficiency. It also prepares employees for the practical problems of real life work. There are so many benefits that not using Structured Training program is like stealing from our company. I'm sure the National Training Association would not market the program unless it actually worked.

Given What I have said, I really think we should adopt this program. Think about it and get back to me.

Cheers

There are both pros and cons to the co-manager's proposal. Consider how you would respond/react.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

After reading and understanding the above, please hand it back to the experimenter

Appendix G: Manipulation Checks

Start with Question 1. Based on the scenario, judge to what extent the co-manager showed each of the following behaviors. Circle the number that best corresponds to your answer. Use the rating scale shown here.

1 2 3 4

Did not use this tactic at all — Used this tactic to a great extent

1. Explained why complying with his request is important for the company..... 1 2 3 4

2. Used factual evidence to show that his/her proposal was feasible..... 1 2 3 4

3. Explained how you would benefit personally from the request to adopt Structured Training..... 1 2 3 4

4. Explained how complying with the request would help advance your career 1 2 3 4

5. Complimented or praised you 1 2 3 4

6. Acted very friendly and was respectful of you 1 2 3 4

Consider the co-manager's email. On the scale below, circle how strong/weak his arguments were. Circle only one response.



-4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4

Weak — Strong

Appendix H : Commitment

1. Rate how committed you believe you would be to Henry's proposal. Use the rating scale below. Circle the number that best corresponds to your answer.



2. Rate how much you agree/disagree with the following statement. Circle the number that best corresponds to your answer.

"In the end, I would be completely committed to implement Henry's request"



3. Read the 5 statements that follow. Choose what you think your specific reaction would be toward Henry's request.

A. I would refuse to implement the manager's request

B. I would agree to think about it some more but not be inclined to do it

C. I would not be ready to decide yet. I would want more time to think about it

D. I would agree to do it but not enthusiastic. I would only make minimum effort

E. I would be enthusiastic about the change. I would be willing to make strong effort to implement it

Appendix I : Legitimate Power

First, carefully read each descriptive statement and think in terms of the co-manager that sent the email from the hypothetical scenario. Based on the information form the e-mail, try to answer the questions that follow. For each statement, decide to what extent you agree that the co-manager could do this to you. Circle the number which most closely represents how you feel. Use the rating scale below

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	**Disagree**	**Neither Agree or Disagree**	**Agree**	**Strongly Agree**

1.	My co-manager can make me feel that I have commitments to meet.....	1	2	3	4	5
2.	My co-manager can make me feel like I should satisfy my job requirements	1	2	3	4	5
3.	My co-manager can give me the feeling that I have responsibilities to fulfill	1	2	3	4	5
4.	My co-manager can make me recognize that I have tasks to accomplish.....	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix J: Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Tony Bongiorno of the John Molson School of Business at Concordia University (t.bongiorno@gmail.com), under the supervision of Dr. Kathleen Boies, John Molson School of Business, Concordia University (kboies@jmsb.concordia.ca; ext. 2902),

A. PURPOSE

I have been informed that the purpose of the research is as follows:The goal of the study is to examine the relationship between co-workers.

B. PROCEDURES:

The research will be conducted in a classroom in the Downtown campuses of Concordia University. I will be required to read a description of, and fill out questionnaires about, two hypothetical managers in a scenario relating to the workplace. The entire study will take approximately 40 minutes. My name will be kept confidential as only a random participant identification number will identify my questionnaire responses.

C. RISKS AND BENEFITS

- I understand I will be compensated with one class credit for my participation in this study (for applicable classes only) if I am applying through the John Molson School of Business participant pool. Otherwise, I will not receive any form of compensation

D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION

- I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time without negative consequences.
- I understand that my participation in this study is completely confidential (i.e., the research will know, but will not disclose my identity)
- I understand that the data from this study may be published.

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.

NAME (please print) _____

SIGNATURE _____

WITNESS SIGNATURE

_____

DATE

_____

If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 514-848-2424 ext. 7481 or by e-mail at Adela.Reid@Concordia.ca

Appendix K : Thought-Listing Index

We are now interested in what you were thinking while you read the scenario. You might have had ideas all favorable to the recommendation, all oppposed, all irrelevant to the recommendation. Your ideas could also have been a mixture of the three. Any case is fine; simply list what it was that you were thiking while you read the scenario. The next page contains the form we have prepared for you to use to record your thoughts and ideas. Simply write down the first idea that comes to mind in the first box, the second idea in the second box, etc. For now, do not write anything in the circles. In each box, please only put one idea or thought. You should try to record only those ideas that you were thinking while you read the scenario. Please state your ideas as concisely as possible ... a phrase is enough. IGNORE SPELLING, GRAMMAR AND PUNCTUATION. You will have 3 minutes to write your thoughts. We have deliberately provided more space than we think most people will need to ensure that everyone would have plenty of room to write the ideas they had during the message. So don't worry if you don't fill every space. Just write down whatever your thoughts were while you read the scenario. Please be completely honest and list all of the thoughts you had.

DO NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO FILL IN ALL THE BOXES. YOU CAN REFUSE TO CONTINUE IF YOU WISH.

SAMPLE



Now that you have listed your thoughts, we want you to categorize them. Inside each box there is a an empty circle.

- **Place a plus sign inside the circle for thoughts that are favorable towards the co-manager's recommendation to use structured training.**
- **Write a minus sign for thoughts that are unfavorable to the co-manager's recommendation to use structured training.**
- **Write a zero for thoughts that are neutral or irrelevant to the co-manager's recommendation to use structured training.**

Appendix L : Demographic Information

Please provide the following information:

Gende ☐ Male ☐ Female

Age: _____ years old.

Country of Birth ☐ Canada ☐ Other

If other, please specify: _____

First Language

☐ English ☐ French ☐ Other

If other, please specify: _____

Second Language

☐ English ☐ French ☐ Other

If other, please specify: _____

Third Language

☐ English ☐ French ☐ Other

If other, please specify: _____

Program you are registered in: _____

Degree you are registered in:

☐ Bachelor's ☐ Master's ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Other

If other, please specify: _____

Major _____

Appendix M : Post-Research Explanation

Dear Research Participant:

The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in which co-workers can influence each other to comply with their request. The specific techniques that individuals use are called influence tactics.

This study explored influence tactics using the Elaboration Likelihood Model. In simple terms the model says that when a person is willing or not willing to pay attention to a persuasive message they will be convinced by different factors For example, a person who is highly interested to pay attention to an argument will be more convinced by strong logical arguments. However, when a person is not willing to pay attention to a persuasive message (e..g., they are in a hurry), they will be convinced by factors that are not directly related to the message itself (e.g., by whether or not they like the person who is trying to persuade them).

An influence tactic is a behavior or set of behaviours purposely used to change another person's (the target) behavior or attitude. The influence tactics explored in this study are called proactive tactics. These are used when an agent expects a target to resist their request. While the nature of the request is wide-ranging, proactive tactics concern what Yukl referred to as immediate task objectives. This includes persuading the target (i.e., the employee) to perform a new task, to support a change, or simply to cooperate with the manager. We focused on three proactive tactics: rational persuasion, apprising, and ingratiation. Rational persuasion is the use of logic to persuade an agent. Apprising is the attempt to show the target the benefits they will incur from complying with, or committing to, the request. Ingratiation is the use of friendliness and other strategies to make the agent more likeable.

In the present study, the scenarios used different types of arguments for the co-worker's email. Depending on the experimental condition you were in, the co-worker used either strong or very weak logical arguments preceded by one of three influence tactics (apprising, ingratiation or no influence tactic).

It is expected that the some combinations will be more effective in convincing people to comply with the manager's request. For example, we hypothesized that strong logical arguments are most effective when combined with apprising. However, we expect that weak logical arguments are most effective when combined with ingratiation. In addition we expect that using an influence tactic before strong/weak arguments is more effective that using no tactic at all.

If you would like to read more material on the topic, you can refer to the following books:

Yukl, G. (2006). *Leadership in organizations* (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Petty, R., & Cacioppo, J.T. (1986). *Communication and persuasion: The central and peripheral routes to attitude change.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

Thank you for participating in this study. Your cooperation was greatly appreciated. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact either:

Tony Bongiorno at t.bongiorno@gmail.com; (514) 291-7900

OR

Dr. Kathleen Boies: kboies@jmsb.concordia.ca; (514) 848-2424 ext. 2902